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ARTICLES
THE PUBLIC TRUST: THE LAw's DNA
GERALD TORRESt
NATHAN BELLINGERtI

I.

INTRODUCTION

O

perhaps
threats we currently face,
f all the
none
is asenvironmental
great or as daunting as climate change due to
greenhouse gas emissions from human activities.' It is not an
understatement to say that these greenhouse gas emissions
threaten all living systems on Earth, including human civilization.
Despite the imminent threat that greenhouse gas emissions pose,
government 2 remains unwilling to take the requisite actions to
significantly reduce emissions and address climate change. Unless
immediate action is taken to curb greenhouse gas emissions, the

t Gerald Torres is the Marc and Beth Goldberg Distinguished Visiting Professor of
Law at Cornell Law School and a Professor and Bryant Smith Chair in Law at the
University of Texas School of Law.
tt Nathan Bellinger is a law student (J.D. expected 2014) and the David Brower
Fellow for the Environmental and Natural Resources Law Center at the University of
Oregon School of Law. We would like to dedicate this article to Professor Joseph Sax who
was a friend and mentor for over 35 years. He is often called the "father of environmental
law" and he is the person most responsible for giving us the modern expression of the
public trust doctrine. We would like to thank Mary Christina Wood, the Philip H. Knight
Professor of Law at the University of Oregon, and Tamara R. Piety, the Phyllis Hurley Frey
Professor of Law at the University of Tulsa. We are also grateful for valuable feedback that
we received on earlier drafts from Elizabeth Brown, Gordon Levitt, Rance Shaw, and Lynn
Schaffer.
1. We define climate change broadly to include all impacts resulting from changing
the energy balance of Earth through an increase of greenhouse gas emissions. Our
definition of climate change includes, among other things, changes in temperature,
precipitation, and wind patterns, as well as ocean heating and ocean acidification. For a
discussion of the change in planetary energy balance due to greenhouse gas emissions,
see James Hansen et al., Assessing "DangerousClimate Change": Required Reduction of Carbon
Emissions to Protect Young People, Future Generations, and Nature, 8(12) PLOS ONE 1, 5
(2013), http://www.plosone.org/article/ino%3Adoi%2F0.1371%2Fjournal.pone.00816
48.
2. When we say "government" we mean both federal and state governments and
are referring to all three branches of government. Additionally, while the focus of this
article is the United States, much of the analysis is applicable internationally, and thus
government could also include foreign governments.
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impacts of climate change will be catastrophic and irreversible.
Climate change is contributing to melting sea ice and glaciers, an
increase in pest and disease outbreaks, a rapid decline in
biodiversity, and an increasing frequency of extreme weather
events such as heat waves, floods, droughts, and tropical cyclones.
Rising sea levels are inundating island nations and coastal cities;
droughts threaten to undermine agricultural production and
reduce crop productivity; and record-setting forest fires are
destroying homes and massive swaths of forests.' Climate change
presents a global challenge unlike any other that we have faced as
a human civilization.
When government fails to take action on a pressing issue
like climate change, the question becomes, how can citizens hold
government accountable for its actions, and inactions, when faced
with an impending crisis? If we were being invaded by another
country, confronted with a meteor spiraling towards Earth, or
forced to deal with some other imminent threat to our very
existence, we would expect our government to respond and to
take the necessary measures to protect us. Climate change is no
different-it truly requires governmental action. In the face of this
planetary crisis, citizens should be able to rely on their
government to protect their fundamental and inherent rights to a
stable climate system and a livable future. When government fails
to defend these rights, the public trust doctrine is a legal tool

3. See generally INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE
CHANGE 2014: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION, AND VULNERABILITY: SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS

(Mar. 31, 2014) [hereinafter IPCC, CLIMATE CHANGE 2014], available at http://www.ipccwg2.gov/AR5/report; INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, MANAGING THE
RISKS OF EXTREME EVENTS AND DISASTERS TO ADVANCE CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION:
SPECIAL REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE 40, 133-40

(2007); World Heath Organization, Climate Change and Health: Key Facts,http://www.who.i
(last visited Feb. 12, 2014); EPA,
nt/mediacentre/factsheets/fs266/cn/index.html
Agriculture and Food Supply, http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/impacLs-adaptation/agric
ulture.html (last visited Feb. 12, 2014).
4. IPCC, CLIMATE CHANGE 2014, supra note 3; Hansen et al., supra note 1, at 6, 8; see
also ASIAN DEV. BANK, ADDRESSING CLIMATE CHANGE AND MIGRATION IN ASIA AND THE
PACIFIC 10 (2012), available at http://www.adb.org/sites/default/fiIes/pub/2012/address
ing-climate-change-migration.pdf; IPCC, MANAGING THE RISKS OF EXTREME EVENTS AND
DISASTERS TO ADVANCE CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION: SPECIAL REPORT OF THE
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE 178 (2007); HUGH TURRAL ET AL.,
FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. OF THE U.N., CLIMATE CHANGE, WATER, AND FOOD SECURflY, at xviixviii (2011), available at http://www.fao.org/docrep/014/i2096e/i2096e.pdf; WORLD
BANK, TURN DOWN THE HEAT: WHY A 4*C WARMER WORLD MUST BE AVOIDED 95, 138
(2012) (for migration projection in South Asia and Southeast Asia).
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citizens can use to compel government action to protect both
present and future generations from the irreversible and
catastrophic impacts of climate change.
Governmental inaction, and inadequate action, on climate
change directly contravenes one of the most fundamental
purposes of our government-facilitating the re-creation of
ourselves, our institutions, and our civilizations. Admittedly,
inquiring about the purpose of government will generate all
manner of responses; however, one central purpose of
government is to protect the essential natural resources that
enable our society to function, evolve, and reproduce for future
generations. This purpose is clearly articulated in the public trust
doctrine, which imposes duties on government and instills certain
inalienable rights in the people. The public trust doctrine
constitutes the sovereign legal obligation that facilitates the
reproduction and survival of our society; it is akin to legal DNA.'
Just as DNA carries all of the information for the
construction and reproduction of our bodies, so too the public
trust doctrine carries all of the information for the construction
and reproduction of a healthy society. DNA is "one of the
buildings blocks of the body" like the public trust doctrine is one
of the building blocks of the law.' The public trust doctrine serves
as the foundation for standards of governmental conduct-it is
integral to the operating code of government and carries critical
information about how government will function in the natural
and socio-political world.
The concept of the public trust doctrine is simple: certain
natural resources-such as air, water, and the sea-that are
essential for all humans are held in trust by government for the
benefit of all people, including future generations. Government is
the trustee for these resources, the trust res, and has a fiduciary
duty to protect the resources for the beneficiaries of the trustpresent and future generations. Like DNA, which contains
instructions and information that allows organisms to develop,
survive, and reproduce, the public trust doctrine contains
instructions and information for our government that, if followed,

5. Deoxyribonucleic acid.
6. Ananya, Mandal, What is DNA?, NEWS MEDICAL, http://www.news-medical.net/h
calth/What-is-DNA.aspx (last visited Feb. 10, 2014).
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will allow our constituted society to develop, survive, and
reproduce.
The public trust doctrine is the DNA from which legitimate
power is created; no matter how government grows, changes, and
adapts to its environmental stressors, it can never separate itself
from its inherent characteristics perpetuated by the natural
authority of that DNA. The public trust doctrine instructs our
government to protect and preserve for both present and future
generations the right of all citizens to enjoy natural resources free
from substantial impairment or depletion. This public trust DNA
distinguishes governments of citizens from lords over serfs and
ensures the perpetuity of the natural common property necessary
for a free people and their posterity.' Unfortunately, it is
abundantly clear that government is turning its back on this legal
DNA, and as a result, imperiling the future of nations and human
civilization as we know it. By failing to take action on climate
change, government is not simply putting individual species or
natural resources at risk, as occurs with specific timber sales or the
pollution of a particular waterway. It is putting civilization as we
know it at risk-and that is a big risk. Once we have eliminated the
capacity of civilization and its people to reproduce itself, all that
our government was created to protect is compromised.
Responding to the threat of climate change presents a
unique challenge for government because the impacts of climate
change are long-lived and do not occur immediately. Carbon
dioxide can persist in the atmosphere for centuries, and while
there, it continuously acts to further heat the planet.' This means
that Earth's climatic response to a higher concentration of
atmospheric carbon dioxide is a function not only of recent
emissions, but the persisting share of prior emissions. Due to the
long-lived nature of carbon dioxide and the fact that Earth will
continue to warm for some time, even after emissions cease
completely, government must address carbon dioxide and other
greenhouse gas emissions before the full consequences of climate
change are realized. Government must demonstrate foresight that
individual citizens may not have. This required foresight makes
the government's trusteeship all the more important.

7. Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial
Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REv. 471, 484 (1970).
8. Hansen et al., supra note 1, at 4.

2014]

THE PUBLIC TRUST: THE LAW'S DNA

285

Many aspects of the growth and development of human
civilization have led to the perilous situation we are now presented
with, but one of the most deleterious effects of the last generation
has been the rising societal value of convenience, and the parallel
barometer of the market for determining correctness of a political
or legal result. Government routinely makes decisions that are
most favorable to markets and that will create the greatest
economic value, irrespective of the negative social and
environmental impacts. Government's shift away from its purpose
and disregard for its legal DNA has blurred the important
distinction between consumers and citizens. The fundamental
obligation of government is not to us as consumers, but to us as
citizens. Government's obligation to us as citizens is to protect the
natural wealth that enables us to reproduce our civilization and
function as a constitutional republic. Government cannot ignore
its fundamental obligation to us as citizens any more than an
organism can reject its DNA. Unfortunately, government is failing
to come anywhere close to protecting the essential natural
resources we rely on for our survival and well-being, and as a
result, we are facing a planetary crisis of unimaginable magnitude.
In this article we examine the contours of the public trust
doctrine and explain why it may be a powerful tool to address a
pressing issue like climate change. In Part II we outline the scope
and purpose of the public trust doctrine as it has taken expression
in our law. We explore the sources of the public trust doctrine and
show its pre-constitutional and constitutional dimensions. Then
we show that although the public trust doctrine is commonly
treated as a state doctrine, it is also incumbent upon the federal
government, and we illustrate how it is incorporated into federal
jurisprudence. In Part III we confront various objections to
imposing a trust duty on the management of the atmospheric
resource for purposes of addressing climate change. We address
the political question objection as well as various criticisms rooted
in the doctrine of displacement. Finally, in Part IV, we outline the
role of the judiciary in enforcing government's public trust duty.
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II. THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE
A. The Scope and Purpose of the Public Trust Doctrine
The public trust doctrine is a "principle of vital
importance" that refers to the general fiduciary obligation of
government toward its citizens, and to the related, fundamental
understanding that no legislature can abdicate or irrevocably
alienate its core sovereign powers.9 The public trust doctrine is
frequently described as being of Roman origin, stemming from
the Roman understanding that certain types of property, known as
res communes, have a distinct character requiring unique
treatment.' 0 At common law, these unique types of property are
known as jus publicum, which recognizes that certain natural
resources are public property owned by government for the
people." The public trust doctrine is meant to protect those
resources that have an inherently public character and are not
owned in the same way as traditional property. Early cases
recognized marine resources, tidal waters and the submerged land
beneath them, and navigable waters as resources protected by the
public trust doctrine." However, the scope of protected public
resources has evolved to include resources such as non-navigable

9. Butchers' Union, Co. v. Crescent City, Co., 111 U.S. 746, 766 (1884); see Ill. Cent.
R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 455 (1892); Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814, 819-20

(1879).
10. See Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 525 (1896) ("res communes" or "things
which remain common"); see aLo In re Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d 409, 445
(Haw. 2000) ("In its ancient Roman form, the public trust included 'the air, running
water, the sea, and consequently the shores of the sea."'). Courts have begun to recognize
the breadth of the public trust doctrine and extend it into the modern era. In Texas, for
example, a district court held that "the public trust doctrine includes all natural resources
of the State including the air and atmosphere." Bonser-Lain v. Tex. Comm'n on Envtl.
Quality, No. D-1-CN-11-002194, 2012 WL 2946041 (Tex. 201st Dist. Aug. 2, 2012). The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently stated: "At present, the concept of public natural
resources includes not only state-owned lands, waterways, and mineral reserves, but also
resources that implicate the public interest, such as ambient air, surface and groundwater,
wild flora, and fauna (including fish). . . ." Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d
901, 955 (Pa. 2013) (plurality opinion).
11. SeeCaminiti v. Boyle, 107 Wash. 2d 662, 668-69 (Wash. 1987).
12. See, e.g., Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892) (lands under navigable
waters); Martin v. Waddell's Lessee, 41 U.S. 367 (1842) (navigable waters and lands under
them); Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1 (1821) (navigable waters).
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tributaries," wetlands," groundwater,15 dry sand beaches,' 6
wildlife,' 7 and the air."
Importantly, government does not hold these natural
resources in fee simple, but rather holds them in trust for the
people and only for purposes that benefit the public interest.'9
Government is a usufructuary rights-holder and cannot allow waste
(permanent damage) to the trust resources. 0 As Thomas Jefferson
once stated: "I set out on these grounds, which I suppose to be
self-evident, that the Earth belongs in usufruct to the living
generation." 2 ' This means that the ability to use the trust resources
is limited in two important ways. First, the owners cannot injure
the substance itself; and second, they cannot impair the rights of
future users by destroying or impairing the resources.22 For
example, a riparian landowner with an upstream usufructuary
water right cannot impair the substance of the water so as to
diminish its quantity or quality in a way that destroys the right of a

13. See, e.g., Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Ct. of Alpine Cnty., 658 P.2d 709 (Cal.
1983) (en banc).
14. See, e.g.. just v. Marinette Cnty., 201 N.W.2d 761 (Wis. 1972).
15. See, e.g., In re Water Use PermitApplications, 9 P.3d 409 (Haw. 2000).
16. See, e.g., Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass'n, 471 A.2d 355 (N.J. 1984).
17. See, e.g., Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519 (1896).
18. See, e.g., Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901, 955 (Pa. 2013) (plurality
opinion); Bonser-Lain v. Texas Comm'n on Envtl. Quality, No. D-1-GN-1 1-002194, 2012
WI. 2946041 (Tex. 201st Dist. Aug. 2, 2012); see also Mary Christina Wood, Advancing the
Sovereign Trust of Government to Safeguard the Environment for Present and Future Generations
(Part I): Ecological Realism and the Need for A Paradigm Shift, 39 ENVT.. L. 43, 87 (2009)
("Extrapolating from classic principles of sovereign trust law, the atmosphere can be
characterized as a global asset belonging to all nations on Earth."); Gerald Torres, Who
Owns the Sky? 19 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 515, 523-24 (2002) (Air "was generally categorized
within that class of assets that were invested with a public character. To the extent that
there was a property interest in the sky, it was res communes . . . . Air, or properly
speaking, the atmosphere, is a resource in which everyone has an interest.").
19. See Torres, supra note 18 (explaining that the management of the resources held
in trust by the government is governed historically by principals of trust law).
20. Brief of Law Professors as Amicus Curiae at 19, Alec L. v. Gina McCarthy, Case
No. 11-cv-02235 (D.C. Cir. 2013), http://www.ourchildrenstrust.org/sites/default/files/Fi
ledI .awProfAmicus.pdf.
21. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Sept. 6, 1789), in 6 THE WORKS
OF THOMASJEFFERSON 3, 3-4 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1904) (emphasis added).
22. See 1 FERDINAND MACKELDEY, COMPENDIUM OF MODERN CIVIL lAw 327-31
(Philip Ignatius Kaufman ed., 12th Germ. ed. 1845); see also Brief of Law Professors as
Amicus Curiae, supra note 20, at 19; 2 SIR ROBERT CHAMBERS, A COURSE OF LECTURES ON
THE ENGLISH LAw, DELIVERED AT THE UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD, 1767-1773, at 85 (Thomas
M. Curley ed., 1986).
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downstream riparian landowner with a separate usufruct right.23
Just as holders of a usufructuary right cannot injure the rights of
others who are physically downstream, holders should not be
allowed to injure the rights of others who are temporally
downstream. The public trust doctrine embodies this idea that
every generation has a usufructuary right in the resources of the
Earth, and those interests are protected by the inherently limited
ownership allowed in natural resources.
B. The Sources of the Public Trust Doctrine
While some rights are created by government, othersoften the most important pre-existing rights-are inherent to
humankind and merely secured by government. The public trust
doctrine is one of these inherent rights that pre-dates the United
States Constitution. As such, we suggest that the public trust
doctrine is the chalkboard on which the Constitution is written.
When one writes something on a chalkboard, we see the meaning
of the writing, but we commonly forget that there is still a
chalkboard that created the space for the writing. We recognize
that meaning comes from what is actually written, but there could
be no such conveyance of meaning without the chalkboard as a
foundation. After all, the Constitution was not written on a blank
slate but was written with certain principles and rights in mind. As
the chalkboard on which the Constitution was written, the public
trust doctrine provides the background and context for the
Constitution.
In 1789, when the United States Constitution went into
effect, the existing public rights in natural resources such as land,
water, air, and wildlife were transferred to the newly formed
government for safekeeping for both present and future
generations. While some states subsequently chose to memorialize
the public trust doctrine in their constitutions, 24 the public trust
doctrine exists regardless of whether or not it is written down.
A recent decision by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
clearly articulated this idea that the public trust doctrine is a pre-

23. See, e.g., Snow v. Parsons, 28 Vt. 459 (1856).
24. See Robin Kundis Craig, Adapting to Climate Change: The Potential Role of State
Common-Law Public Trust Doctrines, 34 VT. L. REv. 781, 831-41 (2010) (discussing
constitutional public trust provisions in numerous state constitutions, including Rhode
Island, Louisiana, Vermont, Illinois, and Hawaii); see also PA. CONST. art. I, § 27.
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constitutional idea and an inherent right.25 In Robinson Township v.
Commonwealth, the Court stated: "[T]he concept that certain rights
are inherent to mankind, and thus secured rather than bestowed
by the Constitution, has a long pedigree in Pennsylvania that goes
back at least to the founding of the Republic."2 ' The Court went
on to explain that certain rights articulated in Pennsylvania's
Constitution "are inherent in man's nature and preserved rather
than created by the Pennsylvania Constitution."2 ' These rights
include the right to natural resources:
[T]he Commonwealth, prior to the adoption of
Article I, Section 27 [Pennsylvania's Environmental
Rights Amendment28 ] possessed the inherent
sovereign power to protect and preserve for its
citizens the natural and historic resources now
enumerated in Section 27. The express language of
the constitutional amendment merely recites the
inherent and independent rights of mankind
9
relative to the environment ...
The Supreme Court of the Philippines has expressed a
similar sentiment. It said that the right of future generations to "a
balanced and healthful ecology," though explicitly incorporated
into the Philippine Constitution, "may even be said to predate all
governments and constitutions. In fact, these basic rights need not
even be written in the Constitution for they are assumed to exist
from the inception of humankind."" These are two examples of
courts clearly articulating the idea that some rights, including the
public's right to the protection of natural resources necessary to
their continued existence, are inalienable rights that predate the
enactment of any constitution. These fundamental rights underlie
25. Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 83 A.d 901, 946-50 (Pa. 2013) (plurality
opinion).
26. Id. at 948 n.36 (citation omitted).
27. Id. at 948 (emphasis added).
28. PA. CONST. art. I, § 27 ("The people have a right to clean air, pure water, and to
the preservation of the natural, scenic, historic and esthetic values of the environment.
Pennsylvania's public natural resources are the common property of all the people,
including generations yet to come. As trustee of these resources, the Commonwealth shall
conserve and maintain them for the benefit of all the people.").
29. Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 947 n.35 (quotation and citation omitted).
30. Oposa v. Factoran, 223 S.C.R.A. 792 (Phil. S. Ct. 1993).
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and inform government's obligation to its citizens and cannot be
abrogated.
While the public trust doctrine provides the background
and context for the entire Constitution, it can also be found in
specific constitutional provisions and areas of constitutional law.
One of these provisions is the Preamble to the United States
Constitution. The Preamble summarizes the background
agreements on which the substantive (and procedural) content of
the Constitution is based." It states:
We the People of the United States, in Order to
form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure
domestic Tranquility, provide for the common
defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure
the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our
Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution
for the United States of America. 2
Essentially, what this means is that the power the people
convey to government is conveyed with a duty to protect the
public trust resources. As Professor John Davidson writes: "A
conscientiously stewarded, trust corpus of natural resources,
including a functioning atmosphere and stable climate, is an
indispensable prerequisite if the 'blessings of liberty' are to be
maintained for Posterity."" Furthermore, the beneficiaries
identified in the Preamble, "ourselves and our Posterity," are the
present and future generations whose rights are protected by the
public trust doctrine." All subsequent constitutional provisions
should be construed in this intergenerational light where
possible."

31. "In expounding the Constitution ... every word must have its due force; for it is
evident from the whole instrument, that no word was unnecessarily used, or needlessly
added." Holmes v.Jennison, 39 U.S. 538, 570 (1840).
32. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
33. John Edward Davidson, Draft Atmospheric Trust Litigation Amicus Brief 18 (Nov.
30, 2013), availableat http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=2361780.
34. Id. ("While the posterity clause does not itself confer substantive powers upon
government, it does indicate who the beneficiaries of the powers and rights enumerated
elsewhere in the Constitution should be-'ourselves and our Posterity.'").
35. Id.
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In addition to the Preamble, the public trust obligation can
be located in the reserved powers doctrine. The reserved powers
doctrine is the constitutional doctrine that prevents legislatures
from behaving like errant trustees. The reserved powers doctrine
prevents legislative entrenchment by ensuring that one legislature
cannot legitimately infringe upon the equal sovereignty of later
legislatures." Underlying the reserved powers doctrine is a
concern for protecting the interests of future generations and the
sovereignty of succeeding legislatures. The reserved powers
doctrine is inherently forward thinking: one of its main purposes
is to ensure that future legislatures, with concerns not yet
contemplated and incapable of prediction, are able to use the
same tools wielded by preceding legislatures. The Supreme Court
has recognized the reserved powers doctrine as a constitutional
constraint that limits a legislature's ability to bind or contract away
any "essential attribute of its sovereignty."" A legislature may not
bind through an unrepealable law, alienate through contract, or
destroy through waste those things that are essential attributes of
sovereignty.
At the most fundamental level, the reserved powers
doctrine provides that "the legislature cannot bargain away the
police power of a State."3 Similarly, in the public trust context,
"the state can no more abdicate its trust over property in which
the whole people are interested . .. than it can abdicate its police

powers in the administration of government and the preservation
of peace.""' Like the police power, government's trustee duties

36. Id. at 7-16.
37. See United States v. Windstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 888 (1996) (citation omitted);
see also Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 459 (1892) (discussing the holding from
Newton v. Comm'rs, 100 U.S. 548 (1879) and noting "there could be no contract and no
irrepealable law upon governmental subjects ... that every succeeding legislature
possesses the same jurisdiction and power as its predecessor; that the latter have the same
power of repeal and modification which the former had of enactment ... and that a
different result would be fraught with evil"); Newton v. Comm'rs, 100 U.S. 548, 559
(1879) (recognizing the reserved powers doctrine, the Court proclaimed that "[c]very
succeeding legislature possesses the same jurisdiction and power with respect to them as
its predecessors. The latter have the same power of repeal and modification which the
former had of enactment, neither more nor less").
38. While the law is often concerned with precommitment devices, see, e.g., John A.
Robertson, Precommitment Issues in Bioethics, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1849 (2003), a constitution is
perhaps the cardinal expression in law of a precommitment device.
39. Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814, 817 (1879).
40. See 111. Cent. R.R. Co., 146 U.S. at 453.
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under the public trust doctrine are an essential attribute of
sovereignty protected by the reserved powers doctrine.4 '
As has been illustrated in numerous cases, the legislature
cannot abdicate its trust responsibilities through transfer of trust
assets to private organizations or administrative agencies.4 2
Binding abdications are not limited to actions that bear an
affirmative character; a legislature may also bind a future
legislature through its own inaction. If, through inaction, a set of
factual circumstances develop which forever prohibits the exercise
of an essential attribute of sovereignty, then the legislature has
bound all future legislatures through de facto abdication.4
Whereas an affirmative abdication through contract violates the
reserved powers doctrine by way of voluntary forfeiture, inaction
can also violate the doctrine through the creation of a de facto
abdication.
Essential attributes of sovereignty that are not grounded in
a static foundation are particularly imperiled by legislative
inaction. This is true in the public trust context, where
government's role as a trustee depends on the condition of
essential natural resources. Natural resources, like the
atmosphere, are complicated and delicate. Without proper care,
these resources can deteriorate to a point where restoration is no
longer possible. If the substance of the public trust is irreversibly
destroyed or deteriorated, then government's essential attribute as
a trustee over that substance has been eviscerated." A future

41. See Karl S. Coplan, Public Trust Limits on Greenhouse Gas Trading Schemes: A
Sustainable Middle Ground?, 35 COLUM. J. ENvT'L L. 287, 311 (2010) ("Public Trust
Principles have been described as an essential attribute of sovereignty across cultures and
across millennia.").
42. See Sax, supra note 7, at 509 (discussing Gould v. Greylock Reservation Comm'n,
215 N.E.2d 114 (1966), where plaintiffs brought a suit as public trust beneficiaries and
ultimately prevented the legislature from granting public lands for private development);
see also Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1, 78 (1821) ("The sovereign power itself, therefore,
cannot, consistent with the principles of the law of nature and the constitution of a wellordered society, make a direct and absolute grant of the waters of the state, divesting all
the citizens of their common right. It would be a grievance which never could be long
borne by a free people.").
43. While not a law, nor a contract, legislative entrenchment has manifested itself as
a result of particular factual circumstances. The factual development which has resulted
from the inaction has created a legislative bar to the exercise of an essential attribute of
sovereignty.
44. See MICHAEL C. BLUMM & MARY CHRISTINA WOOD, THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE
IN ENVIRONMENTAL AND NATURAL RESOURCES LAw 72 (2013) (asserting that alienating or
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legislature with different prerogatives, and an eye towards trust
management, may find that there are no laws that it can enact to
accomplish those ends under the apparent factual circumstances.
In violation of the reserved powers doctrine, that future legislature
would be bound by de facto abdication of a previous legislature to
forfeit its fundamental obligation as a public trustee.
Were government to attempt such an abdication through
an affirmative contract or alienation of property, courts could
enjoin government from doing so. In other words, courts can
require legislatures to not act where it would have otherwise acted;
yet, when the same result occurs through inaction, courts have
been reluctant to place an affirmative duty on the legislature."
The distinction seems to be a formalist one-a principle
untethered from its rationale.
In addition to finding the public trust obligation in the
Preamble and reserved powers doctrine, the framers drafted
specific constitutional provisions with the concern for future
generations in mind. The framers displayed their disdain for
entrenchment by prohibiting titles of nobility." Hereditary and
perpetual privileges would limit the ability of later generations to
govern. The vesting clause demonstrates a similar concern.
Legislative power vests equally to all legislative bodies and those
they represent, including future legislatures yet to be elected.
The Equal Protection Clause is designed to ensure that all persons
are treated equally before the law." Temporal inequality requires
a judicial mechanism to ensure the protection of future

destroying essential resources would amount to relinquishing sovereign powers in
violation of the Constitution's reserved powers doctrine).
45. But see Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 534 (1896) ("[I]t is the duty of the
legislature to enact such laws as will best preserve the subject of the trust, and secure its
beneficial use in the future to the people of the state."); In re Water Use Permit
Applications, 9 P.3d 409, 453 (Haw. 2000) ("Under the public trust, the state has both the
authority and duty to preserve the rights of present and fIuture generations in the waters
of the state."); Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901, 927 (Pa. 2013) ("[I]t is the
province of the Judiciary to determine whether the Constitution or laws of the
Commonwealth require or prohibit the perlormance of certain acts.") (citation omitted).
46. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9 ("No Title of Nobility shall be granted by the United
States."); see also Davidson, supra note 33, at 18-19.
47. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § I ("All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested
in a Congress of the United States.") (emphasis added); see also Brief of Law Professors as
Amicus Curiae, supra note 20, at 13-15.
48. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1.
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generations."9 The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment
the
federal
rights
against
incorporates
unenumerated
government. Whether a particular unenumerated right or
limitation

qualifies

depends

on

"whether

the

right

...

is

fundamental to our scheme of ordered liberty ... or ... whether
this right is 'deeply rooted in this nation's history and tradition."'"0
The public trust doctrine, with its deep history in constitutional
and pre-constitutional law surely qualifies under this test.5 ' It is
difficult to see how the very resources which sustain life, such as
the atmosphere, are not essential to the ordered liberty of society.
Without such resources, there can be nothing else, no
enumerated or unenumerated rights, and no legislature or
political structure.
In sum, because the public trust doctrine is the chalkboard
on which the Constitution is written, it is more appropriate to
consider the Constitution as rooted in the public trust doctrine
rather that think of the public trust doctrine as rooted in the
Constitution. It is because the Constitution is rooted in the public
trust doctrine that we see the aforementioned constitutional
provisions reflecting public trust principles.
C. Federalism
At the state level the public trust doctrine and its scope are
relatively clear. States can shape the public trust doctrine through
legislative enactments or through provisions in their constitutions.
In some states, courts have also played a role in enlarging and
preserving the public trust doctrine. States are free to interpret
the public trust doctrine in very broad terms, like Hawaii," or in
very narrow terms, like Idaho.5" However, no state, despite some
attempts, has been able to eliminate the public trust doctrine

49. Brief of Law Professors as Amicus Curiae, supra note 20, at 15-17.
50. See MacDonald v. Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3036 (2010) (citation omitted).
51. See MARY CHRISTINA WOOD, NATURE'S TRUST: ENVIRONMENTAL lAW FOR A NEW
ECOLOGIcAL AGE 129 (2014) (citing Gerald Torres for the proposition that the public
trust is the slate upon which "all constitutions are written" forming the "sovereign
architecture"); see also Brief of Law Professors as Amicus Curiae, supra note 20, at 17-18.
52. See generally HAW. CONST. art. XI, § I ("All public natural resources are held in
trust by the State for the benefit of the people.").
53. See generally IDAHO CODE ANN. § 58-1203 (1996) ("The public trust doctrine as it
is applied in the state of Idaho is solely a limitation on the power of the state to alienate or
encumber the title to the beds of navigable waters as defined in this chapter.").
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entirely." This indicates that there is some external restraint,
some source of higher authority that hedges in the state's
legislative power.
Based on language in the Supreme Court case PPL
Montana, LLC v. Montana,5 and given the extensive shaping of the
public trust doctrine by state courts, it is not unreasonable to think
that the public trust doctrine is simply a creature of state law.
However, the basis for that thinking is not due to any inherent
limitation of the doctrine, but rather the restraint applied by
conflicting doctrines. Where the Supreme Court has restricted the
public trust doctrine to the states, it has always been in the context
of water law disputes; submerged lands have always held a special
place within the realm of state control under the equal-footing
doctrine." Thus, trust obligations arising out of the alienation of
submerged lands, or administrative actions regarding those lands,
are usually a question of state law." However, absent a limiting
doctrine pertaining to a specific type of trust resource, and given
the inability of the state to ignore the doctrine entirely, there is no
reason why public trust obligations do not extend to the federal
government. The state public trust doctrine, as recognized
through state statutes and constitutions, is simply a different trust
in a different context, and its particularities and irregularities
54. For example, Arizona courts have invalidated three attempts by the legislature to
eliminate the public trust doctrine. San Carlos Apache Tribe v. Superior Court ex rel.
Cnty. of Maricopa, 972 P.2d 179 (Ariz. 1999); Defenders of Wildlife v. Hull, 18 P.3d 722
(Ariz. Ct. App. 2001); Ariz. Ctr. for Law in the Pub. Interest v. Hassell, 837 P.2d 158 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1991).
55. PPL Mont., LLC v. Montana, 132 S. Ct. 1215, 1235 (2012) (The Court said that
when dealing with ownership of submerged lands at statehood, "the public trust doctrine
remains a matter of state law.").
56. The Supreme Court has recognized that under the equal-footing doctrine, with
respect to title to the beds of navigable waters, "States retain residual power to determine
the scope of the public trust over waters within their borders." Id. at 1235 (emphasis
added). "All these developments in American law are a natural outgrowth of the
perceived public character of submerged lands." Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho,
521 U.S. 261 (1997). This result necessarily follows because "although [the equal-footing
doctrine] operates to vest the state with sovereignty over certain watercourse land upon
admission to the Union, thereafter, 'the land is subject to the laws of the State."' See
Oregon ex rel. State Land Bd. v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363, 376 (1977).
PPL Mont. and its sister decisions are decided in the context of the equal-footing doctrine
concerning the ownership of submerged lands at statehood. Any understanding of the
public trust doctrine as a creature of state law is really a statement about its status in the
context of water law, not a statement about the doctrine generally.
57. See, e.g., Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. at 286-87 (affirming that a public trust
question is a state law question when it involves state property).
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cannot be applied to the greater public trust. In fact, state
governments, when legislating with respect to the public trust
doctrine only do so in relation to their vested rights in certain
resources. For example, Idaho interprets the limits of the public
trust doctrine in connection with their interest in state submerged
lands and water rights." There is no good reason that the natural
resources the federal government manages on behalf of the
people is free from a public trust duty. It cannot be due to the
non-plenary nature of the federal government because, as to
resources it controls, the duty has always been plenary even if the
character of the government has both limited and plenary
content.
Even if the main articulation of the public trust obligation
is through the states, those main lines of analysis do not preclude
a federal public trust duty incumbent on the federal government.
While there is limited case law that applies the public trust
doctrine to the federal government, this is because most public
trust cases concern resources managed by individual states, such as
a riverbed, and not resources managed by the federal government.
For certain resources that bear a national character, the Supreme
Court has found that the public trust doctrine applies to them.
These national resources often have interstate significance
implicating federal trust obligations. Moreover, some courts have
explicitly stated that the public trust doctrine applies to the
federal government.o For example, in a case regarding migratory
birds, a federal court stated: "Under the public trust doctrine, the
State of Virginia and the United States have the right and duty to
protect and preserve the public's interest in natural wildlife
resources."" Public trust principles can also be found in federal

58. See generally IDAHO CODE ANN. § 58-1203 (1996).
59. See Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 523, 537 (1911) ("All the public lands of the
nation are held in trust for the people of the whole country."); see also Camfield v. United
States, 167 U.S. 518, 524 (1897) ("[I]t would be recreant to its duties as trustee for the
people of the United States to permit any individual or private corporation to monopolize
them for private gain."); United States v. Trinidad Coal & Coking Co., 137 U.S. 160, 170
(1890) (finding that public lands arc "held in trust for all the people").
60. See United States v. 1.58 Acres of Land, 523 F. Supp 120, 124 (D. Mass. 1981)
("[A]dministration of the public trust is subject to the paramount rights of the federal
government to administer its trust with respect to matters within the federal power....
[T]he trust impressed upon this property is governmental and administered jointly by the
state and federal governments by virtue of their sovereignty. . . .").
61. In re Stetiart Transp. Co., 495 F. Supp. 38, 40 (E.D. Va. 1980) (emphasis added).
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statutes regarding oceans, fisheries, and migratory birds, among
others. 2 Like oceans, the atmosphere is a resource of interstate
significance, and thus implicates federal trust obligations; there is
no rationale to constrain it to the states, as with inland waters.
III. OvERCOMING OBJECTIONS TO IMPOSING A TRUST DuTy ON
THE ATMOSPHERE

When Professor Joseph Sax published his seminal public
trust article in 1970, it brought renewed attention to the public
trust doctrine as a tool to be used in the judicial context. In the
subsequent decades, various objections have arisen in public trust
cases before courts. Here we explain why two objections, the
political question doctrine and statutory displacement, do not
preclude public trust cases seeking action on climate change.
A. The PoliticalQuestion Doctrine
Courts have been reluctant to provide affirmative relief
from policies that result in the mismanagement of trust assets,
fearing that doing so would encroach on a "political question"
properly left for the legislature." However, the political question
doctrine should be read narrowly.6' The political question
62. These federal resources often bear a federal character, and can be adequately
addressed only through action by the federal government. See Missouri v. Holland, 252
U.S. 416, 435 (1920) ("But for the treaty and the statute, there soon might be no birds for
any powers to deal with .... It is not sufficient to rely upon the States."); see also National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969, § 101(b) (1), 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b) (1) (1970) ("Il]t is the
continuing responsibility of the Federal Government to use all practicable means .. . [to]
fulfill the responsibilities of each generation as trustee of the environment for succeeding
generations.").
63. As Professor Sax notes, "courts fear that if they embark upon a consideration of
the 'merits' of environmental disputes, they will be taking upon themselves a primary role
in public policy-making which they feel-with justification-should reside in the
legislative branch of government." However, Sax responds to this concern by explaining
that "the role of courts is not to make public policy, but to help assure that public policy is
made by the appropriate entity, rationally and in accord with the aspirations of the
democratic process . ... In sum, the court serves as a catalyst, not a usurper, of the
legislative process." JOSEPH L. SAX, DEFENDING THE ENVIRONMENT: A HANDBOOK FOR
CITIZEN ACTION 149, 151, 157 (1970).
64. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962) ("Prominent on the surface of any
case held to involve a political question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional
commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially
discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding
without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non judicial discretion; or the
impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of
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doctrine is a threshold question of justiciability-whether the
court is the proper forum to decide an issue or whether it should
be left to the legislature to decide.
The business of the courts is limited to questions presented
in an adversarial context and in a "form historically viewed as
capable of resolution through the judicial process."" Challenges
brought under the public trust doctrine against trust managers fall
squarely within the role of the judiciary. The context is clearly
adversarial when a trustee is sued by trust beneficiaries for the
mismanagement of trust assets. As has always been the case, the
judiciary is responsible for enforcement of the obligations
encompassed within trusts. Whether a particular legislative action
or inaction regarding the disposition or alienation of trust
resources divests future generations and legislatures of rights is a
legal question to be resolved by courts where disputes arise." This
is precisely what the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held in Robinson
Township when it determined that the political question doctrine
did not prevent the Court from reviewing the Commonwealth's
management of public natural resources.67
Importantly, judicial inaction effectively forecloses the
political question for future legislatures by reducing the available
policy options." Mismanagement of trust assets divests future
legislatures of important rights in two ways: first, it has the
potential to deny future legislatures the ability to deal with the

the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for
unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of
embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one
question.").
65. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95 (1968).
66. See generally Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
67. Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901, 928 (Pa. 2013) ("There is no
doubt that the General Assembly has made a policy decision respecting encouragement
and accommodation of rapid exploitation of the Marcellus Shale Formation, and such a
political determination is squarely within its bailiwick. But, the instant litigation does not
challenge that power; it challenges whether, in the exercise of the power, the legislation
produced by the policy runs afoul of constitutional command. Responsive litigation
rhetoric raising the specter ofjudicial interference with legislative policy does not remove
a legitimate legal claim from the Court's consideration; the political question doctrine is a
shield and not a sword to deflectjudicial review.").
68. This reduction in legislative options contravenes the reserved powers doctrine.
See Newton v. Comm'rs, 100 U.S. 548, 559 (1879) ("It is vital to the public welfare that
each [legislature] should be able at all times to do whatever the varying circumstances and
present exigencies touching the subject involved may require."). The courts must step in
to prevent this violation.
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question at all; and second, it limits the ways in which future
legislatures can choose to answer that question. If the trust assets
are completely and irreversibly depleted or destroyed, then the
future legislature is denied entirely its right to ask and answer the
questions related to trust management." Moreover, if the
substance of the trust is irreparably degraded, certain legislative
policies are rendered obsolete by their basic inapplicability to the
altered state of the trust. Thus, appropriate judicial action
preserves the constitutional role of the legislative branch by
ensuring that a question not properly foreclosed is preserved for
future legislatures.
Whether government has a fundamental constitutional
obligation to oversee the atmosphere as a sovereign trust resource
does not implicate the political question doctrine. 70 Such a
determination is nothing more than "the vindication of a
constitutional right."' Ajudicial determination of the existence of
the trust obligation and whether rights protected by the public
trust doctrine have been violated is merely the courts holding the
legislature and executive branches to their respective
constitutional duties.72
Even if one were to believe that interested parties, with
their various perspectives on the integrity of the atmosphere,
should proceed through the regular political process, that process
would necessarily be imperfect. The regular process of policy
creation only functions if all parties have an opportunity to be
heard. This is especially true where the question involves assets
held in trust for the entire public. Interested parties normally gain
access to the legislative process through their ability to vote and
form organizations that lobby for their interests. However, future
generations, by their very nature, cannot avail themselves of these
traditional policy tools. This is precisely why these public resources
are bundled into a trust rather than held in fee simple by
government and treated like any other property government
might own or control. Government is the trustee of public
69. See BLUMM & WooD, supra note 44.
70. See San Carlos Apache Tribe v. Superior Court ex rel. Cnty of Maricopa, 972 P.2d
179, 199 (Ariz. 1999) ("It is for the courts to decide whether the public trust doctrine is
applicable to the facts. The Legislature cannot by legislation destroy the constitutional
limits on its authority.").
71. Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 930.

72.

See id.
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resource assets for the benefit of future generations so that they
may enjoy the trust resources. That does not mean the resources
cannot be used, but there is a heavy burden on that use. It has to
be justified not only by current needs, but by future needs as
well." In other words, where courts examine doctrines that exist to
serve later generations, the political question doctrine simply does
not apply in the same way it would in other contexts.74
The public trust obligation cannot be considered simply a
political question because, as the chalkboard on which the
constitution is written, its existence predates the kinds of politics
permitted by the structures of governance. The particular
methods by which the legislature fulfills its public trust duties may
be a political question, but the determination of whether or not
those methods sufficiently fulfill a government's fiduciary
obligation to the beneficiaries of the trust assets is not a political
question. If the legislature fails to protect trust resources, then it
has failed to uphold the fundamental duty that is the public trust,
but it has not supplanted the relevance of the public trust
doctrine.
B. Displacement
A second obstacle that has arisen in public trust cases
seeking action on climate change is the displacement doctrine.
However, unlike other common law rights, the public trust
doctrine is not subject to statutory displacement." The public trust
doctrine is not supplanted by the mere existence of legislation
which addresses public trust assets. No deference is owed to
administrative or legislative bodies who interpret the public trust;
"it must ... be emphasized that mere compliance by these bodies
with their legislative authority is not sufficient to determine if their
actions comport with the requirements of the public trust
doctrine."" Even at the state level, the fact that there is a federal
73. See Torres, supra note 18, at 230 (explaining that the management of the
resources held in trust by the government is governed historically by principals of trust
law).
74. For example, contexts such as Congress's ability to regulate internal affairs or
challenges to the impeachment process.
75. But see Alec L. v. Jackson, 863 F. Supp. 2d 11, 15-16 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (holding
that that the public trust doctrine can be displaced by the Clean Air Act).
76. Kootenai Envtl. Alliance, Inc. v. Panhandle Yacht Club, Inc., 671 P.2d 1085, 1095
(Idaho 1983).
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statute is not dispositive, because those statutes merely serve as a
baseline." Such a result is sensible, because otherwise it would be
impossible to even assess whether or not the statutes are
functioning to supplement the public trust doctrine in a
practicable way. Legally, courts have to determine whether the
public trust doctrine is capable of being displaced by a statute at
all. The statute cannot procedurally displace the public trust
doctrine such that it throws out a common law cause of action in
favor of actions as provided for in the statute. If it did, then it
would entirely destroy the ability for a court to examine whether
or not a statute fulfills the trustee's duty. The statute itself will not
answer whether or not the statute is sufficient; that issue can only
be resolved by looking at the statute independently and the
actions taken under the statutory authority.
The public trust doctrine is not subject to displacement for
two primary reasons. First, statutes can only displace common law;
thus, because of the constitutional nature of the public trust
doctrine, a statute cannot displace it. As we have already made
clear, there is abundant support for the proposition that the
public trust is constitutional in nature; therefore, the displacement
analysis should end there. However, for those that view the public
trust doctrine as a common law doctrine, we also explain why
public trust cases are not subject to displacement under a
traditional displacement analysis. Because the focus of this article
is climate change, our displacement analysis specifically examines
why the Clean Air Act" does not displace public trust claims
seeking action on climate change.
i. A Brief Primer on Displacement
Displacement occurs when Congress enacts a statute, or an
administrative agency publishes regulations with rulemaking
power delegated from Congress, that overrides existing federal
common law." Displacement is premised on separation of

77. See Bonscr-Lain v. Tex. Comrn'n on Envtl. Quality, No. D-1-GN-1 1-02194, 2012
WL 2946041 (Tex. 201st Dist. Aug. 2, 2012).
78. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7 6 71q (1990).
79. John Wood, EasierSaid than Done: DisplacingPublic Trust Nuisance When States Sue
for Climate Change Damages, 41 ENvrL. L. REP. 10316, 10321 (2011).
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powers" concerns because it governs the relationship between the
three branches of the federal government.' According to the
Supreme Court, " [o]ur commitment to the separation of powers is
too fundamental to continue to rely on federal common law by
judicially decreeing what accords with common sense and the
public weal when Congress has addressed the problem."8 2
When determining that common law has been displaced by
an act of Congress, courts consider whether the displacing law
"speaks directly to the question at issue."" Put differently,
common law is displaced by a statute when "the field has been
occupied"" or "the problem has been thoroughly addressed by
statute or regulation such that there is no interstice to be filled.""
It is worth noting that the "existence of laws generally applicable
to the question is not sufficient," and the displacement test
remains an "issue-specific inquiry."" Certain factors, such as the
lack of a federal remedy8 7 or when using common law to
supplement statutory or regulatory schemes will not render the
schemes "meaningless,"" will favor a determination that
displacement had not occurred.

80. While displacement and preemption are sometimes confused, prcemption deals
with the interaction between federal and state law and thus is premised on federalism
principles. See id. (discussing the differences between preemption and displacement).
81. Id.
82. City of Milwaukee v. Illinois & Michigan (Milwaukee ll), 451 U.S. 304, 315 (1981)
(quoting Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 194 (1978)); see also id. at 313-14 ("We
have always recognized that federal common law is subject to the paramount authority of
Federal common law is a necessary expedient, and when Congress
Congress ....
addresses a question previously governed by a decision rested on federal common law the
need for such an unusual exercise of lawmaking by federal courts disappears.") (citation
omitted).
83. Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2537 (2011) (alterations in
the original) (quotation omitted).
84. Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 324.
85. Wood, supra note 79, at 10319 (quotation omitted).
86. Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 696 F.3d 849, 856 (9th Cir.
2012).
87. See Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, Wis. (Milwaukee 1), 406 U.S. 91, 103-04 (1972);
see alsoAm. Elec., 131 S. Ct. at 2537-38 (The Court explained that the federal common law
right to seek emission reductions from the defendants' power plants is displaced because
the "same relief' is available under the Clean Air Act, suggesting that if the plaintiffs
sought a relief that was different from the relief available under the Clean Air Act, their
common law claim would not be displaced.); Wood, supra note 79, at 10318.
88. Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 315; see also Wood, supra note 79, at 10319.
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ii. The Public Trust Doctrine Cannot be
Displaced by Statute Because it is
Constitutional in Nature
As illustrated in the preceding sections of this article, the
public trust doctrine is chalkboard on which the Constitution is
written and holds constitutional force.8" Due to its constitutional
nature, the public trust is not susceptible to statutory displacement
because constitutional law overrides statutory law. In the words of
Professor Albert Lin, "the public trust doctrine functions in a
quasi-constitutional way: it establishes overarching fiduciary
principles regarding trust resources that may not be overridden by
legislative or executive action."- As a fundamental attribute of
sovereignty, the public trust doctrine has constitutional force in
both the United States Constitution and every state constitution."
Because of its constitutional nature, the Supreme Court
has never said that a state could do away with the public trust
within its borders, and courts have invalidated attempts to do so."9
For example, in San Carlos Apache Tribe v. Superior Court," the
Arizona Supreme Court considered the validity of a state water
rights statute that read: "In adjudicating the attributes of water
rights pursuant to this article, the court shall not make a
determination as to whether public trust values are associated with
any or all of the river system or source."" In holding that this
statutory provision was invalid, the Court explained that the public
trust doctrine is a "constitutionallimitation" on the legislative power
to give away public trust resources-a limitation that the
legislature cannot destroy by statute or order the courts to make

89. See supra Parts I, I.A.
90. Albert C. Lin, Public Trust and Public Nuisance: Common Law Peas in A Pod?, 45
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1075, 1095 (2012) (emphasis added); see WooD, supra note 51, at 129
(stating that the public trust "cannot be repudiated, abridged, or surrendered by any
legislature").
91. See, e.g., PA. CONST. art. 1, § 27; see also Kundis, supra note 24 and accompanying
text.
92. Alexandra B. Klass, Modern Public Trust Principles: Recognizing Rights and
IntegratingStandards, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 699, 705 (2006).
93. San Carlos Apache Tribe v. Superior Court ex rel. Cnty. of Maricopa, 972 P.2d
179 (Ariz. 1999).
94. Id. at 199 (quoting ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-263(B) (1995) (West)).
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inapplicable." In fact, rather than being subject to statutory
displacement, the public trust can be used to invalidate legislative
acts that contravene or abrogate the public's interest in trust
assets. The most famous example of this is Illinois Central Railroad
v. Illinois," where the Supreme Court invalidated an act of the
Illinois legislature granting the Illinois Central Railroad Company
over 1,000 acres along Lake Michigan's shorefront because the
State held the land in public trust and the legislature could not
abrogate that trust."
When considering the constitutional nature of the public
trust doctrine, a displacement argument is difficult to make
because it would require a logical restructuring of our
understanding of the supremacy doctrine: ordinary legislation
cannot displace the public trust doctrine any more than it can
displace the Constitution. Thus, instead of being subject to
displacement by statute, the converse is actually true: because of
the priority of constitutional norms the public trust doctrine can
be used to curb invalid legislative actions, as seen in San Carlos
Apache Tribe and Illinois Central.
Again, thinking about the public trust doctrine as the
chalkboard on which our laws are written is useful here: we can fill
this chalkboard with laws until you cannot see any board behind it,
but you know it is still there. The Clean Air Act is one of the laws
written on the chalkboard. However, the public trust doctrine
continues to act as a floor, setting a minimum level of protection
for the air and our atmosphere; the Clean Air Act does not
displace the public trust doctrine but supplements it.
iii. Even as a Common Law Doctrine the
Public Trust Doctrine is Not Displaced by
Statute
While we believe the displacement analysis should end
here, we offer an alternative analysis for those hesitant to accept
the constitutional nature of the public trust doctrine. As explained
below, even when treated as a common law doctrine, public trust

95. Id. (emphasis added).
96. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
97. Id. at 463-64; see Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Origins of the
American Public Trust Doctrine: What Really Happened in Illinois Central, 71 U. CHI. L. REV.
799, 930 (2004).
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cases seeking action on climate change (i.e., greenhouse gas
emission reductions) are not displaced by the Clean Air Act for
three primary reasons: (1) the Clean Air Act does not "speak
directly to the question at issue" in public trust cases; (2) there is a
lack of federal remedy; and (3) supplementing the Clean Air Act
with the public trust doctrine does not render the statute
"meaningless.""
First, the Clean Air Act does not "speak directly to the
question at issue" in public trust cases because the core inquiry is
fundamentally different. Public trust cases ask courts to consider
whether the legislative and executive branches are fulfilling their
fiduciary duty to adequately protect trust resources, in this case the
atmosphere, for the beneficiaries of the trust assets. This core
inquiry requires courts to determine whether the atmosphere has
been substantially impaired and whether the government is acting
as a proper trustee of the asset." There are no statutes, including
the Clean Air Act, that "speak directly" to this core inquiry of
whether the government is complying with its fiduciary public
trust duty to protect the atmosphere.
In contrast, the Clean Air Act provides one means that
government, as trustee, can use to protect trust assets. The Clean
Air Act gives the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") the
power to decide what activities and which emissions should be
regulated, to what extent those activities should be regulated, and
how to implement specific regulations to reduce emissions.'oo The
Clean Air Act does not ask the more fundamental question of
whether the protections in the statute adequately protect the
atmosphere from substantial impairment.

98. While this section focuses specifically on why public trust cases seeking action on
climate change arc not displaced by the Clean Air Act, a similar analysis in the context of
other natural resources would show that public trust cases seeking their protection are
also not displaced.
99. See Mary Christina Wood et al., Securing Planetary Life Sources for Future
Generations: Legal Actions Deriving from the Ancient Sovereign Trust Obligation, in
THREATENED ISlAND NATIONS: LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF RISING SEAS AND A CHANGING
CLIMATE 531, 575 (Michael B. Gerrard & Gregory E. Wannier eds., 2013) [hereinafter
THREATENED ISlAND NATIONS] ("A trust claim lodged against a sovereign does not invade

the actual sphere of regulation-deciding what activities to curtail and to what extentbut rather demands an accounting of the bottom-line effectiveness of the regulation
(combined with other tools) to achieve asset protection.").
100. See Summary of the Clean Air Act, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENcY, http://www2.epa.gov
/laws-regulations/summary-clean-air-act (last visited Feb. 20, 2014).
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Environmental laws have been described as operating in
their own silos: "[E]ach [law] has different definitions and lists of
regulated pollutants, and focus in different media-water, air, soil,
food, pesticides, etc. None consider ecosystems as a whole."10 1
While this silo approach is generally used to describe the
relationship between environmental statutes, it is also the
approach taken within the Clean Air Act to regulate air pollution.
The Clean Air Act regulates different emission sources
independently (motor vehicles, power plants, aircrafts, etc.)
without regard for the overall health of the atmosphere.o 2
Although it makes sense to regulate cars differently from power
plants, in order to adequately protect a national-indeed
international-resource like the atmosphere, regulations must be
crafted within the framework of an overall target or goal of
protecting the atmosphere. This target must be informed by the
best available science, not politics, if the res is to be truly
protected. The best available science tells us that in order to
protect the planet from the worst effects of climate change, the
target should be reducing atmospheric levels of carbon dioxide to
350 parts per million ("ppm") by the end of the century. 03
However, the silo approach taken under the Clean Air Act fails to
consider the end goal and consequently is proving to be a woefully
inadequate mechanism to protect the planet from climate
change.' 04
Public trust cases seeking action on climate change ask
governments to implement a comprehensive climate recovery plan
to restore the concentration of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere
to 350 ppm by the end of the century. 05 Additionally, public trust
cases may question whether the Clean Air Act adequately
empowers the government to fulfill its fiduciary obligation to
protect the atmosphere. A Clean Air Act lawsuit, in contrast, may
allege that the statute is not being properly implemented or that

101. David Hodas, Vantage Point, 26 NAT. RES. & ENV. 1, 1 (2012).
102. See generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671 (1990).
103. For an example of scientific analysis of climate change targets, see Hansen ct al.,
supra note 1.
104. Since the promulgation of the Clean Air Act of 1970, the concentration of
carbon dioxide in the atmosphere has increased from 326 ppm to 396 ppm, well past the
safe level of 350 ppm. See NAT'L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIc ADMIN., ftp://aftp.cmdl.noaa.g
ov/products/trends/co2/co2_annmean-mlo.txt (last updated Feb. 5, 2014).
105. See, e.g., Alec L. v. McCarthy, 863 F. Supp. 2d 11, 14 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
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there is a failure of enforcement. However, this is a different
question than whether the Clean Air Act is even capable of
adequately protecting the atmosphere.'116 Because the Clean Air
Act does not ask whether the statute is sufficient for the
government trustees to meet their trust obligation to protect the
atmosphere from substantial impairment, displacement cannot
prevent courts from engaging in this core inquiry. Law professor
Mary Wood aptly summarizes this situation: "[N]o matter how
extensive a regulatory scheme under the [Clean Air Act] may be,
the scheme itself does not 'speak directly to the question' of
whether the regulation alone is adequate to meet the fundamental
fiduciary duties of asset protection.""" In short, because the core
inquiry of public trust cases is different than the core inquiry of
Clean Air Act cases, the statute does not "speak directly" to the
issue in public trust cases seeking action on climate change and
displacement does not occur.
Second, public trust cases seeking action on climate
change are not displaced due to the lack of a federal remedy. The
remedy plaintiffs may seek in public trust cases is different than
any remedy available under the Clean Air Act-that is, the remedy
sought is not "within the precise scope of remedies prescribed by
Congress."'" In public trust cases, a plaintiff could ask for an
accounting of the overall effectiveness of the government's actions
in protecting an essential natural resource on behalf of future
generations. The relief sought in Alec L. v. McCarthy is illustrative
of this point.'0 o There, the plaintiffs asked, inter alia, that the court
require the federal agency defendants to prepare a climate
recovery plan that is consistent with the best available science,
develop an annual carbon budget, and reduce carbon dioxide
emissions in the United States by at least six percent per year.' o
106. According to Professor Mary Wood it is "nearly inconceivable" that the
regulations under the Clean Air Act alone can protect the atmosphere since adequately
protecting the atmosphere would also require land use reform, reforestation,
infrastructure changes, soil improvement, tax incentives, and many other things.
THREATENED ISIAND NATIONS, supra note 99, 575-76.
107. Id. at 576.
108. Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, Wis. (Milwaukee 1), 406 U.S. 91, 103 (1972).
109. Alec L., 863 F. Supp. 2d II (while the case parties were Alec L., et al., v. Jackson
3
et al. in the District Court, the case is now Alec L., v. McCarthy, No. I 1-cv-022 5 (D.C. Cir.
2014) on appeal in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia).
110. Amended Complaint at 39-40, Alec L. v. Jackson, 863 F. Supp.2d II (D.C. Cir.
2012) (No. C 1-02203).
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This type of macro-level remedy is not available under the Clean
Air Act."'
On the other hand, the types of remedies available under
the Clean Air Act tend to be sector-specific. A notable example of
this is Massachusetts v. EPA,"'2 where plaintiffs sued to compel the
EPA to implement new regulations under the Clean Air Act for
motor vehicle emissions."' Other examples include Center for
Biological Diversity v. EPA," where plaintiffs sought to compel the
EPA to regulate emissions from marine vessels, aircrafts, and other
non-road vehicles, and Resisting Environmental Destruction on
Indigenous Lands v. EPA,"' where plaintiffs argued that air quality
permits for offshore arctic drilling should be withdrawn."' The
remedies sought in each of these cases were sector-specific, microlevel remedies, which are all that are available under the Clean Air
Act's regulatory scheme. The macro-level, atmospheric scale,
resource management remedies sought in public trust cases are
unavailable under the Clean Air Act, and are not subject to
displacement.
It is worth noting here that the relief sought in public trust
cases seeking action on climate change can be easily distinguished
from the relief sought in Connecticut v. AEP,"' even though public
trust cases, like AEP, are ultimately seeking reductions in
greenhouse gas emissions. As previously noted, the commitment
that courts have to the separation of powers is a strong principle
behind the displacement doctrine. In a case like Connecticut v.
AEP, it is understandable why a court would be reluctant to rule
that five specific power plants should reduce their greenhouse gas
emissions when the Clean Air Act regulates greenhouse gas

111. For information about other public trust cases seeking action on climate change
see US Legal Actions, OUR CHILDREN'S TRUST, http://www.ourchildrenstrust.org/legal/US
-Action (last visited Apr. 6, 2014).
112. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
113. Id.at505.
114. Ctr. For Biological Diversity v. EPA, 794 F. Supp. 2d 151, 153 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
115. Resisting Envtl. Destruction on Indigenous Lands v. EPA, 716 F.3d 1155, 115859 (9th Cir. 2013).
116. For information on other Clean Air Act cases see Clean Air Act Cases, CTR. FOR
CLIMATE & ENERGY SOLUTIONS, http://www.c2es.org/federal/courts/clean-ar-act-cases
(last visited Feb. 28, 2014).
117. Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011).
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emissions from the very same power plants."' Such decisions are
usually left to the executive branch, through administrative
agencies.
However, public trust cases do not seek emission
reductions from specific parties; and therefore, courts are not put
in a position of having to determine which power plants should be
regulated. In public trust cases, a court need only decide that a
certain amount of reductions are necessary to protect trust assets,
while the decision of who, how, and what to regulate remains in
the hands of the executive branch (pursuant to power given to it
by Congress)."' Because the ultimate relief in public trust cases
comes from either the executive or legislative branch, courts do
not need to worry about infringing on the constitutionally
delegated powers of another branch of government, and thus any
separation of powers concerns are alleviated.'2 0
Finally, public trust cases seeking action on climate change
are not displaced because supplementing the statutory and
regulatory scheme of the Clean Air Act with the public trust
doctrine would not render those schemes "meaningless." 2 ' As
previously illustrated, the Clean Air Act is sufficiently different
from the public trust doctrine that allowing the two to coexist
would not render the statute or regulations enacted by the EPA
meaningless. Indeed, because the proper understanding of the
Clean Air Act is as a means (or at least a partial means) for
fulfilling the government's fiduciary public trust obligation to
protect the atmosphere, the Clean Air Act will be a component of

118. See THREATENED ISLAN) NATIONS, supra note 99, 573-80 (discussing the
differences between public trust claims seeking action on climate change and public
nuisance claims like AEP).
119. As Professor Wood explains, plaintiffs in public trust cases "do not ask courts to
prescribe how the reduction [in emissions] will be accomplished. The court's role, rather,
is to set a numerical fiduciary pathway of reduction and then defer to the sovereign
defendant as to how the reduction will be accomplished-subject to the continuing
jurisdiction and supervision of the court to ensure that it actually happens." Id. at 556.
120. Just as AEP can be distinguished from public trust cases seeking action on
climate change, Native Village ofKivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 696 F. 3d 849 (9th Cir. 2012),
is also distinguishable. Kivalina was a public nuisance case seeking damages against
specific polluters. Like AEP, this type of case is more likely to raise separation of powers
concerns because the parties are seeking a remedy against specific polluters. In contrast,
public trust cases do not seek to hold specific polluters responsible, but rather seek a
remedy from the federal government.
121. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
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any plan to protect the atmosphere.12 2 For example, if a court
determined that government was failing to meet its fiduciary duty
to protect the atmosphere from substantial impairment,
greenhouse gas emission reductions could be implemented by the
EPA and other government agencies through the Clean Air Act
(and other statutes or subsequently enacted legislation)."
Accordingly, the Clear Air Act actually complements the public
trust doctrine, and public trust cases seeking action on climate
change would not render the Clean Air Act meaningless but would
actually emphasize the importance of its role in effectuating
emission reductions. For these three reasons, public trust cases
seeking action on climate change are not subject to statutory
displacement.
IV. THE ROLE OF THEJUDICIARY IN PUBLic TRUST CASES
Notwithstanding the passage of numerous environmental
statutes since the 1960s, which have given administrative agencies
significantly more responsibility for the management and
protection of natural resources and the environment, courts still
have an important and unique role to play in the protection of
public trust assets.' 24 When government actions (and inactions)
allow private interests to substantially impair trust resources,
beneficiaries of the public trust can rely on the courts to hold the
government accountable and ensure that it acts in a manner
consistent with the public interest.12' Thus, the public trust
doctrine, enforced by the courts, is an important check on how

122. See Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Ct. of Alpine Cnty, 658 P.2d 709, 726-29
(Cal. 1983) (en banc) (discussing the interaction between statutory law and trust law).
123. The EPA remains the "primary regulator of greenhouse gas emissions" in this
scenario. SeeAm. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2539 (2011).
124. Wood, supra note 18, at 75 ("The judicial branch remains the ultimate guardian
of the trust. While modern natural resources law primarily focuses on statutes and
regulations, it must be remembered that American courts have defined basic sovereign
obligations towards natural resources through common law for two centuries. Decisions
pertaining to the public trust obligation, the Indian trust obligation, treaty rights, water
rights, wildlife law, the federal navigation servitude, private property takings, and public
nuisance make up such a rich and extensive body of natural resources law developed
within the judicial branch.").
125. David Takacs, The Public Trust Doctrine, Environmental Human Rights, and the
Future of Private Property, 16 N.Y.U. ENVrL. L.J. 711, 761 ("While other common law
doctrines may be undone by explicit legislation, the Public Trust Doctrine seems
sacrosanct, holding a power beyond modification or revocation by legislative action.").
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the political branches manage trust assets: it ensures that
government trustees protect trust assets for present and future
generations and do not abdicate their fiduciary duty to prevent
substantial impairment to the res.12 6 As one court stated: "Just as
private trustees are accountable to their beneficiaries for
dispositions of the res, so the legislative and executive branches
are judicially accountable for their dispositions of the public
trust .... The check and balance ofjudicial review provides a level
of protection against improvident dissipation of an irreplaceable
res."' 2 1 Professor Joseph Sax explained that public trust law "is a
technique by which courts may mend perceived imperfections in
the legislative and administrative process."
Importantly, courts
are not called on to manage the res. That responsibility is left to
administrative agencies, with guidance from Congress. This is an
important distinction and ensures that the separation of powers
between the three branches of government is respected.
A. The judiciary'sRole in Enforcing the Public Trust
Doctrineis Criticalfor PreservingDemocracy
The public trust doctrine is critical for preserving
democracy, despite some criticism that the public trust doctrine is
undemocratic.12 While courts are frequently called on to protect
the rights of minorities, in public trust cases they are actually
being called on to protect the rights of the majority. Due to a
failure in the political process, a minority now exercises undue
influence over the executive and legislative branches to the
detriment of the majority. This situation is patently undemocratic.
As Professor Joseph Sax explained in his seminal 1970 article on
the public trust doctrine, "self-interested and powerful minorities
often have an undue influence on the public resource decisions of
legislative and administrative bodies and cause those bodies to
ignore more broadly based public interests."o30 He went on to say
126. Brief of Law Professors as Amicus Curiae, supra note 20, at 26.
127. Ariz. Ctr. For Law in the Pub. Interest v. Hassell, 837 P.2d 158, 169 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1991) (citation omitted); see also In re Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d 409, 455
(Haw. 2000) (citing id.).
128. Sax, supra note 7, at 509.
129. See, e.g., James Huffman, A Fish Out of Water: The Public Trust Doctrine in a
Constitutional Democracy, 19 ENvT.. L. 527, 565 (1989) (discussing how the public trust
doctrine allows nondemocratic courts to overrule decisions of democratic legislatures).
130. Sax, supra note 7, at 560.
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that the function of the courts is "to promote equality of political
power for a disorganized and diffuse majority" and that "the
fundamental function of courts in the public trust area is one of
democratization."'3 ' In situations like the one we currently face,
where minority special interest groups (e.g., the fossil fuel
industry) have a disproportionate influence on decisions related
to the use and management of natural resources and the
protection of the environment, the courts have an important role
to play in protecting the majority and restoring balance to our
democracy. 132
Even in public trust cases that call on the judiciary to
invalidate acts of the executive or legislative branches or to compel
action, the courts are preserving, not undermining, democracy. As
David Takacs explains, "while democracy may seem subverted
when a court overrules the acts of elected officials, such judicial
acts in fact serve democracy by preserving rights invested in all the
people."' 3 3 Others describe the public trust doctrine as a
"corrective response to political failures in the democratic
process."l 34 The Robinson Township case from Pennsylvania is the
most recent example of a court invalidating a legislative act in
order to protect the rights of a majority, all Pennsylvanians,
against a minority special interest group, the oil and gas
industry.'3 ' There the Court stated:
The public natural resources implicated by the
"optimal" accommodation of industry here are

131. Id. at 560-61 (emphasis added).
132. Gerald Torres, Book Review, 42 U. PITT. L. REV. 823 (1981) (reviewing JOSEPH L.
SAX, MOUNTAINS WITHOUT HANDRAILS: REFLECTIONS ON THE NATIONAL PARKS (1980))
(Professor Sax elaborates on the relationship between the environment and democracy in
his review of park policy.). For an example of the fossil fuel industry's influence on the
management of natural resources, one can look to Act 13, H.B. 1950, P.L. 87, No. 13 (Pa.
2012), the statue at issue in Robinson Township. In discussing Act 13, the Court stated: "Act
13's primary stated purpose is not to effectuate the constitutional obligation to protect
and preserve Pennsylvania's natural environment. Rather, the purpose of the statute is to
provide a maximally favorable environment for industry operators to exploit
Pennsylvania's oil and natural gas resources." Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d
901, 975 (Pa. 2013).
133. Takacs, supra note 125, at 715.
134. Lin, supra note 90, at 1084; see also WOOD, supra note 51, at 139 ("A primary
judicial function, however, has always been to ensure that legislative enactments comport
with constitutional expectations.").
135. Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 975.
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resources essential to life, health, and liberty:
surface and ground water, ambient air, and aspects
of the natural environment in which the public has
an interest. As the citizens illustrate, development of
the natural gas industry in the Commonwealth
unquestionably has and will have a lasting, and
undeniably detrimental, impact on the quality of
these core aspects of Pennsylvania's environment,
which are part of the public trust.'
While it is understandable that courts are reluctant to
intervene in decisions made by administrative agencies or
Congress, such interventions are critical for preserving democracy
when actions by the political branches benefit a small minority to
the detriment of the majority. Furthermore, it is important to
remember that the role of the courts in public trust cases is still
constrained.' For example, in public trust cases seeking action
on climate change, a court could require an agency to prepare a
climate recovery plan, but the specific details of the plan would
ultimately come from the agency, not the court. The judiciary's
role is to ensure that the political branches protect trust assets
from substantial impairment, not to dictate specific environmental
policies. Substantive decisions about how best to protect and
manage trust assets would remain in the hands of the
democratically elected branches of government.
B. The Judiciary'sRole is Especially Important in Light of
the Failureof the Executive and Legislative Branches to
Take Action on Climate Change
The failure of the executive" 8 and legislative branches'" to
take any meaningful action to reduce greenhouse gas emissions

Id.
Lin, supra note 90, at 1086.
138. See, e.g., Ryan Lizza, The President and the Pipeline, THE NEW YORKER (Sept. 16,
2013), http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2013/09/16/130916fa-factlizza?currentP
age=all (describing President Obarna as an oil and gas friendly president and noting that
the reason Lisa Jackson left the Environmental Protection Agency was because of Obama's
inaction on climate change).
139. See, e.g., Ryan Lizza, As the World Burns, THE NEW YORKER (Oct. 11, 2010), http:/
/www.newyorker.com/reporting/20 10/10/1l / 101011 fa_fact lizza (describing the failure
of Congress to pass climate change legislation in 2010); see also Brief for Dr.James Hansen
136.
137.
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and address climate change makes it even more important for the
judiciary to fill this void. The executive and legislative branches
absolutely must act to address climate change in order to fulfill
their fiduciary duty to the trust beneficiaries. However, until the
political branches act, our tripartite system of constitutional
government gives citizens one last opportunity to vindicate their
core rights-the judiciary.140 As the nation's leading public trust
scholars explained in an amicus curiae brief, "[c] ourts are being
called upon . .. to ensure that the political branches fulfill their

obligation to avoid destruction or irreparable harm to an asset
that must sustain future generations.""'
Unfortunately, the role of the judiciary as a "powerful
institutional arbiter of environmental disputes""' has been
substantially reduced in the past several decades."' The
administrative deference doctrine, an increasingly restrictive
standing doctrine, the political question doctrine, and procedural
hurdles all combine to make it difficult for plaintiffs to have their
cases decided on the merits. 4 4 It is important to recall, however,
that, " [i] n general, the Judiciary has a responsibility to decide
cases properly before it, even those it would gladly avoid."'4"
We are faced with a situation where inaction on climate
change is already causing, and will continue to cause, severe
destruction, hardship, and calamity for both present and future
generations.' 4 ' In light of such daunting consequences of inaction,
we need judges who will protect the rights of all citizens against a
self-interested minority and a government that is failing to meet its
obligation to protect its citizens.' 4 7 We need judges to stop
as Amicus Curiae at 5, 14, Alec L. v.Jackson (N.D. Cal. 2011) (No. 3:11-cv-02203), available
http://www.ourchildrenstrust.org/sites/default/files/Hansen%20Amicua%20.pdf
at
[hereinafter Brief for Amicus Curiae Dr. James Hansen] (describing the fossil fuiel
industry's "stranglehold on Congress" and how the executive branch bows to industry
pressure).
140. WOOD, supra note 51, at 108.
141. Brief of Law Professors as Amicus Curiae, supra note 20, at 26.
142. WOOD, supra note 51, at 108.
143. See, e.g., Wood, supra note 18, at 59 (" [T]he judiciary has lost its potency as a
third branch of government operating in the environmental realm.").
144. See, e.g., WOOD, supra note 51, at 108-12.
145. Zivototsky ex rel. v. Clinton, 132 S. Ct. 1421, 1427 (2012).
146. See, e.g., Hansen et al., supra note 1.
147. As Professor Sax observed:
Ajudge can ignore the realities and presume that everyone who ought
to be heard will be heard in time, on the assumption that in the
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avoiding the tough questions, like climate change, and to tackle
the issues head on.14 8 Of course, we also need equally courageous
and determined lawyers and citizens to bring these cases before
judges.
Reflecting on the landmark 1892 Illinois CentralRailroad.'.
case, Professors Joseph Kearney and Thomas Merrill noted the
courage that it took the Court to reach its decision. 0 Now, over a
century later, we need judges to display a similar courage when
they are presented with public trust cases seeking action on
climate change."' Indeed, they may be our last hope. In an amicus
curiae brief in support of a public trust case seeking action on
climate change, renowned climate scientist Dr. James Hansen
wrote: "In the absence of political leadership," the courts "may be
the best, the last, and, at this late state, the only real chance to
preserve and restore the atmosphere and climate system."' At a
time when political action on climate change seems unlikely,
courts, as arbiters of justice and defenders of the Constitution,
have an opportunity to use the law to address the present climate
crisis at hand.
V. CONCLUSION

Professor Robert Cover said: "To live in a legal world
requires that one know not only the precepts, but also their
connections to possible and plausible states of affairs. It requires
that one integrate not only the 'is' and the 'ought,' but the 'is,' the

legislative process, as in a bakery shop, one takes his number and waits
his turn. Or, adjusting flexibility to the situation before him, he can
focus attention on the desirability of trying to assure that an important
matter does get heard in a timely fashion.
SAX, supra note 63, at 203 (emphasis in original).
148. School desegregation is arguably the best example of the courts addressing a
very tough question that the political branches of government were avoiding.
149. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
150. Kearney & Merrill, supra note 97, at 930.
151. While the full impacts of the Robinson Township case from the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court are yet unclear, this case, already being described as "a landmark ruling,"
is a good example of the type ofjudicial courage that we are referring to. See e.g. Michael
A. Riccardi, Big Shale Ruling Tops Year for Top Court, PITSBURGH POST-GAZETTE (Jan. 6,
2014), http://www.post-gazette.com/business/legal/2014/01/06/Big-shale-ruling-tops-ye
ar-for-Pennsylvania-Supremc-Court/stories/201401060008.
152. Brief for Amicus Curiae Dr. James Hansen, supra note 139, at 14.
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'ought,' and the 'what might be.'" 3 In the context of climate
change, the "is" means knowing a world where climate change is
already occurring and is threatening human civilization as we
know it. The "ought" is the idea that we ought to be reducing
emissions, transitioning away from fossil fuels to renewable energy
sources, and restructuring our economy to align with the reality
that we live on a planet with finite natural resources. The "what
might be" is where lawyers, judges, and other citizens have the
opportunity to use legal tools to help facilitate a transition to a
more stable and safe future. The public trust doctrine provides a
powerful and compelling legal framework to support legal actions
and other initiatives that seek to compel government action on
climate change and help us move from the "is" to the "what might
be" of Professor Cover's formulation.
Pursuant to the public trust doctrine, our government has
a fundamental obligation to protect the resources that are central
to our society-land, water, wildlife, and air. This obligation
predates the Constitution and actually underlies the very purpose
of the Constitution. When government fails to protect the
essential natural resources central to our society-resources that
belong to all of us, including future generations-the
fundamental ability of civilization to reproduce itself is threatened.
Today, we face a situation where government is failing to
reduce greenhouse gas emissions to the level required to restore
and protect our climate system, and it is no exaggeration to say
that this inaction threatens civilization as we know it. The science
is unequivocal: the failure to take immediate and significant action
to address climate change threatens the natural resources we rely
on to survive and to reproduce our society. Our water supplies,
coral reefs and fish stocks, forests, and agricultural land are all
threatened by climate change.1 54
The public trust doctrine offers a legal framework that
citizens can use to compel government to fulfill its fiduciary duties
to protect natural resources. The modern public trust doctrine is
firmly supported by the principles of constitutional law and is an
essential attribute of sovereignty. When government unlawfully
abdicates its fiduciary obligation to protect trust resources through
its actions or inaction, citizens should be able to rely on the
153. Robert M. Cover, Nomos and Narrative,97 HARv. L. REV. 4, 10 (1983).
154. See supra notes 3, 4.
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judiciary to protect their rights and the rights of future
generations. When citizens bring public trust cases to protect trust
resources, courts should resolve the cases on the merits and not
avoid the tough public trust and constitutional questions. As
demonstrated, doctrinal obstacles such as political question and
statutory displacement do not apply to public trust cases as they
would apply to ordinary common law cases.
With a pressing issue like climate change, where delay is
not an option, the courts may be our last hope to try and compel
action before it is too late. The public trust doctrine, with its
macro-level focus on the overall health of the atmosphere, may be
the best legal mechanism to protect our climate system and the
ability of our society to reproduce and evolve to face the
challenges that lie ahead.

